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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, t 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 900218-CA 
v. : 
MARIO JOSE VELASQUEZ, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of possession a 
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1990). This Court has jurisdiction to hear 
the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 
1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court 
correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence, ruling 
that the stop was not pretextual. Because of the trial court's 
advantageous position in determining the factual basis for a 
motion to suppress, this Court will not reverse the trial court's 
factual evaluation unless its findings are clearly erroneous. 
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. 
granted, P.2d (Utah 1989). However, in assessing the 
trial court's legal conclusions based upon its factual findings, 
this Court applies a correction of error standard. Id. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV t 
The right of people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Mario Jose Velasquez, was charged with two 
counts of possession of a controlled substance, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1990) 
(Record [hereinafter "R."] at 8). Defendant filed a motion to 
suppress the evidence against him which was denied (R. 28). 
Defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea to count I, 
specifically preserving his right to appeal the trial court's 
denial of his motion to suppress pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 
P.2d 935, 939 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (R. 35, 43). The State moved 
to dismiss count II and sentencing was stayed pending appeal to 
this Court (R. 35, 43). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On November 30, 1990, Officer Allen Hedenstrom's 
attention was drawn to a car with mismatched license plates as 
he watched it park at approximately 9th South and State Street in 
Salt Lake City (Transcript of suppression hearing, March 20, 1990 
[hereinafter "T."] at 4). When he observed the car a short while 
later, further east on 9th South, Officer Hedenstrom stopped the 
The front plate number read 398 BHC while the rear plate number 
read 114 DCF. 
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vehicle and approached defendant, the sole occupant and driver, 
to ask for his driver's license and registration (T. 4-5). 
Defendant replied that he had no driver's license and showed 
officer Hedenstrom a previous traffic citation for driving 
without a license, which had been issued to a Jeff Martinez, as 
identification (T. 5, 8). Defendant was then arrested for 
2 
driving without a license (T. 6). The car was impounded and 
inventoried in accordance with department policy, to avoid 
vandalization or other damage, because defendant had no license 
and there was no one else present to take his car (T. 6-7, 14). 
During the course of the inventory, Officer Hedenstrom opened an 
unlocked cash box located on the floor near the driver's seat in 
which he found substances later identified as cocaine and heroin 
(T. 7). Another officer transported defendant to the jail while 
Officer Hedenstrom remained with defendant's vehicle until it 
could be towed to the impound lot (T. 12). 
In denying defendant's motion to suppress the evidence 
seized, the trial court issued written findings. (A copy of the 
court's Ruling on Motion to Suppress is attached hereto as 
Addendum A). The trial court specifically found that (1) the 
stop was based on a violation of law and was not pretextual; (2) 
defendant's arrest was justified by his failure to produce a 
driver's license, his prior citation for driving without a 
license, and his giving false information to a police officer; 
(3) the impound was justified to avoid leaving the vehicle 
Officer Hedenstrom could not recall whether defendant produced 
a valid registration for the vehicle (T. 5). 
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unattended; and (4) the inventory search was proper (R. 28). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
By failing to precisely aver his allegations of pretext 
concerning the initial stop of his vehicle in the trial court, 
defendant has waived consideration of his argument on appeal to 
this Court. In his motion to suppress and at the hearing on that 
motion, defendant did nothing more than claim that the stop of 
his vehicle was pretextual. He did not argue that the 
hypothetical reasonable officer would not have made a stop under 
the circumstances, nor did he refer the court to any evidence 
produced by the State or by him to suggest that the hypothetical 
reasonable officer would not have stopped him in this case. 
Defendant also failed to precisely aver his arguments concerning 
the propriety of the subsequent impound and inventory search in 
the trial court; thus, consideration of these issues is similarly 
waived, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS WAS PROPER. 
Defendant asserts that Officer Hedenstrom's stop of his 
vehicle for a traffic violation constituted an unconstitutional 
pretext stop, and, therefore, the trial court should have 
suppressed the cocaine and heroine subsequently seized pursuant 
to an inventory search of the impounded vehicle. 
Under the fourth amendment, to lawfully stop a vehicle 
for investigatory purposes, an officer must have at least a 
reasonable suspicion that either the vehicle or an occupant has 
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violated or is about to violate the law (i.e., a traffic or 
equipment regulation, or any applicable criminal law). Delaware 
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661, 663 (1979); State v. Gibson, 665 
P.2d 1302, 1304 (Utah), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 894 (1983); State 
v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 507 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). A stop of a 
vehicle is, of course, also justified when the officer has 
probable cause to believe that either the vehicle or an occupant 
has violated the law. Ibid. Defendant does not claim that the 
Delaware v. Prouse standard was not met when Officer Hedenstrom 
stopped his vehicle for having different license plates attached 
to the front and the rear of the vehicle. Rather, he claims that 
the stop was an unconstitutional pretext stop, which "occurs when 
the police use a legal justification to make the stop in order to 
search a person or place, or to interrogate a person, for an 
unrelated serious crime for which they do not have the reasonable 
suspicion necessary to support a stop." United States v. Guzman, 
864 F.2d 1512, 1515 (10th Cir. 1988). 
In State v. Sierra 754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), 
disavowed on other groundsf State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 689 
(Utah 1990), this Court set forth the standard for determining 
whether an unconstitutional pretext stop has occurred: "[I]f a 
hypothetical reasonable police officer would not have stopped the 
driver for the cited traffic offense, and the surrounding 
circumstances indicate the stop is a pretext, the stop is 
unconstitutional." Id. at 979. The test is an objective one, 
focusing on whether the reasonable officer would have made the 
stop under the circumstances, not whether the officer could have 
-5-
made a stop. Ici. at 977-78; Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1517. See 1 
LaFave, Search and Seizure, §1.4(e) at 15 n.44.1 (Supp. 1991). 
On appeal, defendant challenges the continued viability of 
Sierra, asserting that under article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution, evidence of a police officer's subjective intent is 
a relevant consideration in evaluating pretext claims (Brief of 
Appellant [hereinafter "Br. of App."] at 9-17). However, because 
defendant did not raise or develop his argument in the trial 
court, the state constitutional question should not be addressed 
by this Court. State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327-28 (Utah Ct. 
App.), cert, granted, P.2d (Utah 1989). Accordingly, the 
State does not address this question except to clarify that an 
objective standard is appropriate. 
In support of his state constitutional argument under article 
I, Section 14, defendant notes that although this Court maintains 
that reference to the officer's subjective state of mind is 
inappropriate, in practice, the Court has referred to an 
officer's subjective state of mind in assessing allegations of 
pretext stops (Br. of App. 13). As examples, defendant cites 
State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 
Sierra, 754 P.2d at 979-980; and State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 
767, 768 n.3, 771 n.10 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Defendant's 
observation has merit in so far as it points out an apparent 
inconsistency between the objective standard this Court purports 
to follow and its reference to evidence of the officer's 
subjective intent or motivation in evaluating allegations of 
pretext in the above cases. However, mere recognition of this 
past inconsistency does not, as suggested by defendant, require 
the conclusion that a subjective test is either necessary or 
appropriate in resolving allegations of pretext. See 1 LaFave, 
Search and Seizure, § 1.4(e) at 95 (1987). 
As additional support for his argument defendant asserts that 
the United States Supreme Court has condoned the use of evidence 
of an officer's subjective intent and, as a result, federal case 
law on the subject is confusing (Br. of App. nn.8-9). However, 
defendant overconstrues the case law which either does not 
discuss the proposition for which it is cited or involves facts 
and circumstances which invoke concerns different from those 
which arise in connection with a pretextual vehicle stop. 
Moreover, in Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985), the 
Supreme Court clearly set forth an objective standard for 
determining whether a fourth amendment violation has occurred. 
Specifically, the Court stated that the test turns on an 
assessment of the officer's conduct in light of the facts and 
circumstances confronting him at the time, and not on the 
officer's subjective intent or motivation. Id. (quoting Scott v. 
United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136 (1978)). See also Horton v. 
California, U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2308-09 (1990) (Court 
notes that evenhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the 
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A. Defendant Failed to Precisely Aver His Allegations 
of Pretext Surrounding the Initial Stop of His 
Vehicle in the Trial Court; Thus, He has Waived 
Consideration of the Issue on Appeal to this 
Court. 
In his motion to suppress and at the hearing on that 
motion, defendant did nothing more than claim that the stop of 
his vehicle was pretextual and cite Sierra to the court. He 
neither stated the "hypothetical reasonable officer" standard nor 
argued that the hypothetical reasonable officer would not have 
made a stop under the circumstances. Nor did he refer the court 
to any evidence produced by the State or by him to suggest that 
the hypothetical reasonable officer would not have stopped him in 
this case. See State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d at 771 n.10. In 
short, he did not even suggest that police officers do not 
routinely stop vehicles for the particular traffic violation 
which provided the basis for the stop of his vehicle. See Ibid. 
The absence of any of these arguments to the trial court should 
preclude consideration of defendant's pretext argument on appeal. 
See State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985) ("[Wjhere a 
defendant fails to assert a particular ground for suppressing 
unlawfully obtained evidence in the trial court, an appellate 
court will not consider the ground on appeal."); State v. 
Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) (because the grounds for 
objection raised on appeal were not specifically or distinctly 
Cont. application of objective standards of conduct, rather 
than standards that depend upon the subjective state of mind of 
the officer). 
4 
Defendant does not attack the validity of his arrest for 
driving without a license and for giving false information. 
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stated to the trial court, those grounds were not presercved for 
appellate review). Defendant's conclusory allegation of pretext 
and passing reference to Sierra were simply insufficient to 
preserve the pretext issue he now presents on appeal. Indeed, 
the inadequacy of defendant's argument regarding pretext is 
reflected in the trial court's ruling, which does not analyze the 
pretext question in terms of the hypothetical reasonable officer 
but instead disposes of it on the ground the stop was legal 
because it was clearly based upon a reasonble suspicion of a 
violation of the law (R. 30; see Addendum A). This ruling is 
actually nothing more than a conclusion that the stop did not 
violate Delaware v. Prouse; it does not address the question of a 
permissable pretext stop, which necessarily presumes that the 
5 
stop complies with Prouse . 
Insofar as Sierra suggests that the Prouse reasonable suspicion 
test and pretextual stop test are components of a single test 
upon which to evaluate the validity of a vehicle stop, it is 
incorrect. The Prouse standard and the pretext stop standard are 
two distinct standards to be applied independently. The former 
provides the basis upon which to evaluate the reasonableness of 
the intial seizure of the vehicle (which is usually for a 
misdemeanor traffic violation), while the latter is relevant to 
only the evidence of another crime (usually more serious than the 
traffic violation) discovered pursuant to the vehicle stop. This 
is made clear in United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th 
Cir. 1988), where the Tenth Circuit treated the government's 
objection to the court's adoption of a Sierra-type pretextual 
stop standard as follows: 
Contrary to the Government's argument, our 
approach will not "severely" curtail "the 
ability of the New Mexico State Police . . . 
to enforce traffic laws." Brief of the 
Appellant—United States of America at 14. 
No prosecution for violation of a traffic 
regulation will be affected. Police officers 
may always issue appropriate citations to 
drivers who violate traffic regulations. 
Only evidence of a more serious crime 
-8-
B. Defendant has Waived Consideration by this Court of 
the Propriety of the Impound and Inventory Search 
of his Vehicle by Not Precisely Avering These 
Issues as Grounds for Suppressing the Evidence 
Against Him in the Trial Court. 
On appeal to this Court, defendant asserts there was no 
statutory authorization or other circumstances justifying the 
impoundment of his vehicle and that the subsequent inventory 
search was pretextual because it was not conducted in conformity 
with established reasonable procedures; therefore, the trial 
court should have suppressed the evidence seized pursuant to 
State v. Hyqh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) (Br. of App. 22). 
However, because defendant failed to precisely aver 
these particular grounds for suppressing the evidence to the 
trial court, and because there is nothing in the record to 
indicate that the argument was "unavailable or unknown to 
defendant at the time he filed his motion to suppress," he has 
not preserved these issues for review by this Court. Carter, 707 
P.2d at 660-61. See also Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 16 
(Utah 1988) (requirement of a specific objection on the record 
ensures that the trial court will understand the basis of the 
objections and have an opportunity to correct any errors as well 
as assure that the reviewing court will have a record of the 
grounds asserted below; thus, where the trial court has not been 
given a fair opportunity to avoid an error, the reviewing court 
will not usually consider any claim based on that error). 
5 
Cont. discovered pursuant to such a stop 
will be excluded if the stop was 
unconstitutionally pretextual. 
864 F.2d at 1518. 
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Defendant's motion to suppress, which was not accompanied by a 
supporting memorandum, was narrowly focused on his allegation of 
a pretextual stop and did not address the propriety of the 
impound or inventory search (R. 25; a copy of defendant's Motion 
to Suppress is attached hereto as Addendum B). Furthermore, 
defense counsel failed to precisely aver the arguments he now 
raises on appeal in his argument at the motion to suppress 
hearing: 
MR. VALDEZ: The leading constitutional 
cases, is the Opperman case and the Harris 
case, but the State case, I think, relevant 
is State v. Sierra. I would ask the Court to 
read that. I think Mr. Lemcke, you are aware 
of the State v. Sierra case. I have copies I 
would like to provide to the Court. Relevant 
page is 977 in the Sierra case, if I may 
approach the bench. I would ask that the 
Court read these and take the matter under 
advisement, and advise the attorneys as to 
whether or not — what the Court's decision 
would be after the Court has read the 
decisions. 
. . . 
MR. VALDEZ Opperman is the general case in 
terms of inventory searches, Judge. And I 
think if you read that . . . you will learn 
something about inventory searches. 
The problem is, Judge, what we have heire he 
says it was an inventory search. He also 
says it was a search incident to arrest. 
Now, which is it? In terms of the inventory 
search, there is no law against what items 
were taken out. None was provided in the 
police report. He says there is probably one 
somewhere, although that hasn't been produced 
by the State who has the burden of showing 
that it was a proper search. 
In addition to that, Judge, the other thing 
is to, and you will see that in the State v, 
Sierra, they have indicated, yes, a police 
officer may however stop an automobile for a 
traffic violations committed in the officer's 
-10-
presence. Well, it had two different plates 
on it, although it was properly registered. 
But it goes on to say in Sierra on page 977: 
"It is impermissible for law enforcement 
officers to use a misdemeanor arrest as a 
pretext to search for evidence of a more 
serious crime." 
It is our position that that is what occurred 
here, Judge, and the items that were found 
ought to be suppressed. 
(T. 15, 17-18; a copy of counsel's argument before the trial 
court is attached hereto as Addendum C) (emphasis added). 
Defense counsel's "conclusory allegations" and vague reference to 
the inventory search at the suppression hearing were simply 
insufficient to afford the trial court a "fair opportunity" to 
consider the propriety of the impound and inventory search in 
this case. Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d at 16. 
At least as much specificity should be 
required in a pretrial objection to the 
admissibility of evidence, i.e., a motion to 
suppress, as is required in an oral objection 
made during the course of a trial. In fact, 
even more specificity could reasonably be 
required because the pretrial objection can 
be researched and written under relatively 
calm circumstances, as distinguished from an 
extemporaneous objection made in the heat of 
trial. 
Carter, 707 P.2d at 660-61 n.2 (quoting State v. Johnson, 16 Or. 
App. 560, 519 P.2d 1053 (1974)). Moreover, the trial court 
treated defense counsel's argument as a secondary challenge to 
the general validity of inventory searches, as is demonstrated by 
its reliance on South Dakota v. Oppermanf 428 U.S. 328 (1976), in 
briefly finding that the impound was justified and that the 
-11-
inventory search was proper (R. 31-32; see Addendum A). 
Therefore, this Court may properly decline to address these 
7 issues on appeal• 
The language from Opperman quoted in the trial court's ruling 
merely notes the necessity and validity of inventory searches 
conducted as a matter of course after police have properly 
impounded a vehicle. See Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369. 
7 
Should this Court determine that defense counsel marginally 
preserved the propriety of the impound and inventory search for 
review and that these issues are determinative, this case should 
be remanded for a rehearing on these issues. Defense counsel's 
argument at the motion to suppress hearing was simply inadequate 
to alert the State or the trial court that the propriety of the 
subsequent impound and inventory were at issue. Therefore, 
because neither of the parties focused on these issues at the 
motion to suppress hearing, the trial court was not able to make 
detailed findings of fact and the record before this Court is 
simply inadequate for meaningful review. State v. Marshall, 791 
P.2d 880, 882 n.l, 887 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (remand for rehearing 
where the parties and the trial judge did not focus on critical 
issues at suppression hearing). See Combs v. United States, 408 
U.S. 224, 228 (1972) (remand appropriate where record before 
Court was "virtually barren of the facts necessary to determine 
whether petitioner had standing). 
Notwithstanding the above, should this Court look past 
defendant's waiver to address the merits of this case based on 
the record currently before it, the State acknowledges that 
Officer Hedenstrom's conclusory testimony alone may be 
insufficient for this Court to determine whether the inventory 
was conducted pursuant to "established reasonable procedures." 
See Hygh 711 P.2d at 268 n.17 (procedural order setting forth 
police department standards was introduced in its entirety at 
trial; thus, on appeal, the Utah Supreme Court was able to 
compare the written policy with the officer's conduct). See also 
Ex Parte Boyd, 542 So.2d 1276, 1282-83 (Ala. 1989) (where 
officer's conclusory testimony that inventory was done in 
compliance with department regulations was held to be 
insufficient, court noted the record must sufficiently reflect 
what the policy is, describe the policy in such a way that its 
reasonableness can be reviewed, and present adequate evidence of 
what the employed criteria were); Rabadi v. State, 541 N.E.2d 
271, 275 (Ind. 1989) (state must do more than offer the mere 
statement of a police detective that the search was conducted as 
a routine inventory to make required showing that its actions 
come within the inventory exception). 
-1 0-
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully submits 
that this Court should either affirm the ruling of the lower 
court or remand for rehearing on the issues of the propriety of 
the impound and inventory search. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3/* day of December, 1990 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
kltioAA. fawJlfiA-
(IAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
I n l i v <l.<x>'*.V:: • / • . c ' . ' ^ ; 
W§£> 
MAR 2 1 1930 
^ , 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARIO JOSE VELASQUEZ, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
CIVIL NO. 901900313 FS 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress came on for hearing on March 
20, 1990. The defendant was present with counsel and 
interpreter, and the State was represented by its counsel. 
Evidence was received, the case argued, and authorities relied 
upon presented by both counsel. The Court took the matter 
under advisement. 
The Court now rules as follows. 
The only witness, the arresting officer, testified that the 
motor vehicle driven by the defendant had different license 
plates on the front and rear, therefore, he pulled it over. 
The driver could not produce a driver's license. He did 
produce a prior traffic citation wherein he had been cited for 
having no driver's license. During this stop, the defendant 
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gave different names to the officer. No evidence was offered 
as to whether or not there was a registration card in the 
vehicle. 
Based upon the above, the officer arrested the defendant. 
Since he was alone, the automobile was impounded. Following 
police department procedures, an inventory was made of the 
automobile wherein a cash box was found on the floor by the 
driver's seat containing a substance believed to be a 
controlled substance, and paraphernalia in relationship to the 
same. Defendant was booked for driving without a driver's 
license, giving false information to the police officer, and 
possession of a controlled substance. 
Defendant argues that the stop was a pretext to 
unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and, 
therefore, the fruits of such illegal search should be 
suppressed. 
The State argues that the stop was not a pretext for a 
search, but for violation of the law in the presence of the 
officer. The search that occurred was an inventory search in 
relationship to impounding the vehicle. 
Section 41-1-43, Utah Code Ann., requires the issuance of 
"two identical registration plates11 for every motor vehicle 
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other than a motorcycle, trailer, etc. The said Section 
further provides that the plates so issued may not be removed 
from the vehicle or used upon any other vehicle. 
Section 41-1-48, Utah Code Ann., requires that every motor 
vehicle, except a motorcycle, trailer, etc., shall have 
attached to the front of the vehicle one license plate, and the 
other license plate to the rear. 
The automobile driven by the defendant at the time of the 
stop had different license plates attached to the front and 
rear of the car. Therefore, operation of such car would be in 
violation of the law. The officer had a right, and a duty, to 
stop this motor vehicle because of this violation of law. 
Therefore, the stopping of this vehicle was a valid stop. 
Upon further inquiry, the driver of the automobile could 
not produce a driver's license, but did produce a prior 
citation indicating he had previously been arrested for driving 
without a license. He also gave the officer different names. 
Based upon all of the above, the officer was justified in 
arresting the defendant and booking him. The stopping of this 
vehicle was not a mere pretext to searching of the automobile. 
The stop was made for violation of the law in the presence of 
the officer. The subsequent arrest and booking were justified 
under the totality of the circumstances. 
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The impounding of the vehicle was justified since the 
defendant was alone and the vehicle could not be left on the 
streets. Police authorities are justified in making an 
inventory of such vehicles at the time of impounding. As 
stated in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 49 L.Ed.2d 
1000 (1976): 
When vehicles are impounded, local police 
departments generally follow a routine 
practice of securing and inventorying the 
automobile's contents. These procedures 
developed in response to three distinct 
needs: the protection of the owner's 
property while in remains in police 
custody... the protection of the police 
against claims or disputes over lost or 
stolen property... and the protection of the 
police from potential danger.... The 
practice has been viewed as essential to 
respond to incidents of theft or vandalism. 
The above court went on to state that such caretaking 
procedures have been uniformly upheld by state courts 
throughout the various jurisdictions, and that the majority of 
the federal courts of appeals have likewise "sustained 
inventory procedures as reasonable police intrusions." The 
United States Supreme Court upheld the police inventory of an 
impounded vehicle under the facts of that case. 
STATE V. VELASQUEZ PAGE FIVE RULING ON MOTION 
We hold that the stop was valid, as was the arrest, and 
that the inventory by the police authorities of the automobile 
in this case was justified because the car was being 
impounded. The inventory was justified for the reasons stated 
above. The discovery of the suspected evidence was made during 
a legal search of this vehicle. 
Based upon the above, defendant's Motion to Suppress the 
evidence taken during the inventory search is denied. 
Dated this <C\ I day of March, 1990. 
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JAMES A. VALDEZ (3308) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR STATE LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
v. 
MARIO JOSE VELASQUEZ, 
Defendant 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 901900313FS 
JUDGE LEONARD H. RUSSON 
The defendant, MARIO JOSE VELASQUEZ, by and through his 
attorney of record, JAMES A. VALDEZ, hereby moves the Court to 
suppress all evidence taken from the defendant in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the following grounds: 
1) Search of the vehicle should have been conducted 
pursuant search warrant. 
2) No probable cause to stop. 
3) There was a pretext stop and subsequent to arrest there 
was no crime in the presence of the officer for which 
defendant should of been arrested. 
DATED this day of March, 1990. 
JA1MES A'. VALDEZ 
orney for Defendant 
0002 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
You and each of you please take notice that the 
above-entitled matter will come on regularly for a hearing 
on Tuesday, the 20th day of March, 1990, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. 
before the Honorable LEONARD H. RUSSON, Third District Court Judge. 
Please govern yourselves accordingly. 
DATED this 6> day of March, 1990. 
^ic/iA vTW J 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the County Attorney's 
office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah this day 
of March, 1990. 
SLIVERED B^ 
MAR 0 61990 
.JOEY FINOCCHIC 
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1 THE COURT: Okay, go ahead. 
2 1 MR. VALDEZ: The leading constitutional cases, 
3 I is the Opperman case and the Harris case, but the State 
4 J case, I think, relevant is State vs. Sierra. I would ask 
5 I the Court to read that. I think Mr. Lemcke, you are 
6 aware of the State vs. Sierra case. I have copies I 
7 J would like to provide to the Court. Relevant page is 977 
8 J in the Sierra case, if I may approach the bench. I would 
9 I ask that the Court read these and take the matter under 
10 J advisement, and advise the attorneys as to whether or 
11 I not — what the Court's decision would be after the Court 
12 J has read the decisions. 
13 THE COURT: Mr. Lemcke. 
14 I MR. LEMCKE: Your Honor, I think it is not 
15 I necessary to take it under advisement. I think that the 
16 J Court can see the contentions here of Mr. Valdez is that 
17 I it was a pretext search. It is clear there is no 
18 I evidence of that or a pretext style. 
19 I The search of the car was done pursuant to an 
20 J inventory, which is a regular police procedure and the 
21 I drugs were found then. There is no reason on the face of 
22 I the allegations why these particular findings should be 
23 I suppressed. 
24 I The allegations are a search of a vehicle 
25 I should have been conducted pursuant to a search warrant. 
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1 J There were none pursuant to an inventory. At the time 
2 I there was no probably cause to go get a warrant. It was 
3 J merely procedural as a vehicle is inventoried before it 
4 I is taken to the impound lot. 
5 I Second, there is no probably cause to stop 
6 I there was probable cause "Here goes a vehicle down the 
7 I street with two different license plates," which is 
8 I certainly probable cause for the officers to find out 
9 J what is going on. And that there was a pretext stop, and 
10 I clearly the evidence does not support that. 
11 I I don't believe that there is any particular 
12 I need for the Judge, for the Court, rather, to read 
13 Sierra, which is a pretext case. 
14 THE COURT: If an officer stops one who is 
15 breaking the law for speeding or doesn't have a license 
16 J plate, and decides that he will arrest him because no one 
17 J is present to take the car, therefore they are going to 
18 I impound the car, is it your position that then the police 
19 I have the right to search every part of the car, luggage, 
20 I and books and everything in it without a search warrant, 
21 I just simply because they have impounded the car and now 
22 I they have a right to an inventory search, to search 
23 J either for weapons or valuables? 
24 MR. LEMCKE: Your Honor, I think they not only 
25 I have a right but a duty both to the owner of the vehicle 
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1 I and themselves, 
2 I THE COURT: And what is your case that guides 
3 I me and tells me that? 
4 1 MR. LEMCKE: Is the Opperman vs. South Dakota. 
5 1 MR. VALDEZ: Opperman is the oldest United 
6 I States Supreme case. 
7 MR. LEMCKE: It says that inventory search 
8 I protects the officer against allegations that they will 
9 steal out of the car, as well as provides an inventory to 
10 J the owner of the car. 
11 THE COURT: That is what I want is the case 
12 that you rely on. I want the case the State relies on. 
13 MR. LEMCKE: I believe that is Opperman vs. 
14 I South Dakota. 
15 I MR. VALDEZ: Opperman is the general case in 
16 terms of inventory searches, Judge. And I think if you 
17 read that — 
18 THE COURT: Is that in here? 
19 MR. VALDEZ: Yes, it is. You will learn 
20 I something about inventory searches. 
21 I The problem is, Judge, what we have here he 
22 I says it was an inventory search. He also says it was a 
23 J search incident to an arrest. Now, which is it? In 
24 J terms of the inventory search, there is no law against 
25 J what items were taken out. None was provided in the 
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1 J police report. He says there is probably one somewhere, 
2 J although that hasn't been produced by the State who has 
3 I the burden of showing that it was a proper search. 
4 I In addition to that, Judge, the other thing is 
5 I to, and you will see that in the State vs. Sierra, they 
6 I have indicated, yes, a police officer may however stop an 
7 automobile for a traffic violations committed in the 
8 officer's presence. Well, it had two different plates on 
9 it, although it was properly registered. 
10 But it goes on to say in Sierra on page 977: 
11 I "It is impermissible for law enforcement officers to use 
12 J a misdemeanor arrest as a pretext to search for evidence 
13 of a more serious crime." 
14 J It is our position that that is what occurred 
15 I here, Judge, and the items that were found ought to be 
16 I suppressed. 
17 J THE COURT: He was arrested simply because he 
18 J did not have a driver's license. 
19 I MR. LEMCKE: He was arrested because he not 
20 I only didn't have a driver's license, but he had already 
21 J been stopped and cited for that at one point. 
22 MR. VALDEZ: Your Honor, the testimony — 
23 MR. LEMCKE: Your Honor, if I may finish. 
24 THE COURT: Let's hear one at a time. Mr. 
25 I Lemcke. 
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MR. LEMCKE: He had been cited for this one 
time previous. The officer used his discretion, arrested 
him. There was no one there to take the vehicle, the 
vehicle was therefore impounded. Incident to an impound, 
it is part of a procedure, the vehicle was searched. Mr. 
Valdez will tell us, "Well, there is some question about 
the scope of the search because it was there." 
The officer testified that the vehicle was 
searched and inventoried. Mr. Valdez asked him and, of 
course, Mr. Valdez"s questions are not evidence: "Well, 
didn't you also do it as part of the search?" "Yes, his 
person was searched as part of the search." 
"Also the car?" "Yes, also the car." But the 
officer told us before that — 
THE COURT: Back up just a moment. I am dust 
saying, he was pulled over because there was a different 
license plate on the front than he had on the rear. And 
then when asked for his driver's license, he couldn't 
produce one. 
MR. LEMCKE: In fact, he stated he had none and 
had previously been cited for it. 
THE COURT: And based on that, it was decided 
to arrest him. 
MR. LEMCKE: That is correct. 
THE COURT: And jail him. 
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I I MR. LEMCKE: That is correct. As to the 
2 J argument for pretext, I think if you will read Sierra 
3 J carefully, a pretext is where officers working with a 
4 I previous suspicion, or a previous desire to stop and 
5 I search, find a misdemeanor or traffic that they can now 
6 J stop someone for as a roost, as a pretext, as the word 
7 I indicates, to then search the person or the vehicle. 
8 J There is the underlying desires to search the vehicle, 
9 I search the person, rather than make a traffic stop on its 
10 I own face. That is not the case here and that is not the 
11 J evidence in front of the Court. 
12 THE COURT: We have a car with different 
13 J license plates. We have the officer not remembering if 
14 there was a registration or not. We have the defendant 
15 without a driver's license, and so what would the 
16 J reasonable officer do if he pulls anyone over at that 
17 I point? I haven't heard anything. If he hadn't had a 
18 registration, then it certainly would have been justified 
19 I to impound the car. You don't know if it is stolen, or 
20 I you don't know what the story is. 
21 J MR. LEMCKE: Or if the driver was under arrest, 
22 J Your Honor, and there was no one else there that could 
23 J drive the car away. 
24 THE COURT: The problem I have with that, is 
25 I everyone that is driving a car without a driver's license 
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arrested and taken to jail? That is kind of — Maybe 
they ought to be, but I am kind of shocked why — What's 
the circumstances here? There has to be something 
articulable. 
MR. LEMCKE: I think that is before the Court. 
The defendant stated, "Well, not only don't I have a 
driver's license, but, look, here I have been cited for 
it before and here I am back driving down the street 
again." Citation didn't work. 
THE COURT: Well, give me your best case before 
noon, if you don't mind, and I will take this under 
advisement. 
MR. VALDEZ: Thank you, Judge. 
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